NetVM

Fleet networking layer. Every node gets a stable network identity; every byte of automation traffic is attributable, consistent, and boring — the way good citizens look to the rest of the internet.

Scope

Per-node egress identity — one Warp-backed egress per chrome-box / node, in its own network namespace. Stable egress IP per node, explicit mapping, isolated blast radius.
Tailscale fabric — node addressing, operator SSH, human reachability.
Human-handoff links — the reachable path a human uses to complete CAPTCHA/2FA on a live browser session (original scope, kept).

NetVM owns networking. chrome-box owns browsers and consumes network from NetVM. email-alert owns notifications. The Account(s) hub owns identity records. Secrets and identities are the human's — agents manage structure and lifecycle only, never credentials.

Why per-node egress

Anti-fraud, not evasion. Providers flag IP-hopping as suspicious. A node that always egresses from the same place looks like what it is: a legitimate machine. Standardizing on Warp is the good-citizen move.
Blast-radius isolation. One IP reputation problem affects one node, never the fleet. Nodes deliberately do not all share one egress.
DevOps standardization. Every node is provisioned the same way: netns + WireGuard-via-Warp + topology entry. No snowflakes.

Nodes may share an egress identity deliberately (documented in NODES.md); sharing is a designed topology choice, never an accident.

Architecture

chrome-box profile (client X)
  -> launched inside netns warp-clientX   (NetVM provides the launcher)
    -> wg interface (Warp WireGuard params, human-generated config)
      -> Cloudflare edge, stable colo      (egress IP in NODES.md)
        -> internet

operator / human
  -> Tailscale tailnet (100.x)             (management + Waypipe handoff)
    -> node tail IP

Warp runs at the network layer, so the browser needs no proxy config — the whole namespace egresses through Warp.

Pattern decision

Two ways to get per-node Warp egress were considered:

warp-cli proxy mode (mode proxy + SOCKS5 per node): simpler, but warp-cli talks to a single system daemon (warp-svc) — running N daemons on one host is unverified and fights the service model.
WireGuard in netns (chosen): Warp is WireGuard under the hood. One wg interface per node namespace, config generated once by the human (wgcf or equivalent), no daemon, no D-Bus, fully scriptable. One interface per chrome-box, each independently up/down-able.

Upgrade path if pool IPs prove too fluid: Cloudflare Zero Trust dedicated egress (true static IPs, paid).

Provisioning a node

Identity creation is the human's job; lifecycle is scriptable:

Human: generate the node's WireGuard config once (wgcf register + wgcf generate, or warp-cli equivalent) and place it at /etc/netvm/.conf (root-owned, 0600). This file is a credential — agents never create, read, or copy it.
sudo bin/netvm-node-up.sh — creates netns warp-, raises the wg interface inside it, verifies egress, prints the result.
chrome-box launches the client's Chromium inside that netns.

Tear down: sudo bin/netvm-node-down.sh .

Files

bin/netvm-verify.sh — prerequisite checks (ip, wg, netns, tailscale…).
bin/netvm-node-up.sh — bring up a node's egress.
bin/netvm-node-down.sh — tear a node's egress down.
bin/netvm-topology.sh — print the live topology table.
NODES.md — the registry: node -> netns -> Warp identity -> egress IP.

Verification checklist

netvm-verify.sh passes on the target host.
Per-node wg interface comes up inside its netns; egress IP differs per node (or matches the designed sharing in NODES.md).
Egress IP per node stable over 7 days (same colo pool).
Chromium launched in the netns reaches the internet via the node's egress (ip netns exec warp- curl ifconfig.me).
Waypipe handoff to a node over the tailnet shows a live browser.
One node's egress killed -> other nodes unaffected (blast radius).

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