NetVM: per-node Warp egress design + lifecycle scripts
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# NetVM
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Fleet networking layer. Every node gets a stable network identity; every
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byte of automation traffic is attributable, consistent, and boring — the
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way good citizens look to the rest of the internet.
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## Scope
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1. **Per-node egress identity** — one Warp-backed egress per chrome-box /
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node, in its own network namespace. Stable egress IP per node, explicit
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mapping, isolated blast radius.
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2. **Tailscale fabric** — node addressing, operator SSH, human reachability.
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3. **Human-handoff links** — the reachable path a human uses to complete
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CAPTCHA/2FA on a live browser session (original scope, kept).
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NetVM owns networking. chrome-box owns browsers and consumes network from
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NetVM. email-alert owns notifications. The Account(s) hub owns identity
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records. Secrets and identities are the human's — agents manage structure
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and lifecycle only, never credentials.
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## Why per-node egress
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- **Anti-fraud, not evasion.** Providers flag IP-hopping as suspicious. A
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node that always egresses from the same place looks like what it is: a
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legitimate machine. Standardizing on Warp is the good-citizen move.
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- **Blast-radius isolation.** One IP reputation problem affects one node,
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never the fleet. Nodes deliberately do not all share one egress.
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- **DevOps standardization.** Every node is provisioned the same way:
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netns + WireGuard-via-Warp + topology entry. No snowflakes.
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Nodes may share an egress identity deliberately (documented in NODES.md);
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sharing is a designed topology choice, never an accident.
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## Architecture
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chrome-box profile (client X)
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-> launched inside netns warp-clientX (NetVM provides the launcher)
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-> wg interface (Warp WireGuard params, human-generated config)
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-> Cloudflare edge, stable colo (egress IP in NODES.md)
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-> internet
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operator / human
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-> Tailscale tailnet (100.x) (management + Waypipe handoff)
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-> node tail IP
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Warp runs at the network layer, so the browser needs no proxy config —
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the whole namespace egresses through Warp.
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### Pattern decision
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Two ways to get per-node Warp egress were considered:
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- **warp-cli proxy mode** (mode proxy + SOCKS5 per node): simpler, but
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warp-cli talks to a single system daemon (warp-svc) — running N daemons
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on one host is unverified and fights the service model.
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- **WireGuard in netns (chosen)**: Warp is WireGuard under the hood. One
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wg interface per node namespace, config generated once by the human
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(wgcf or equivalent), no daemon, no D-Bus, fully scriptable. One
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interface per chrome-box, each independently up/down-able.
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Upgrade path if pool IPs prove too fluid: Cloudflare Zero Trust dedicated
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egress (true static IPs, paid).
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## Provisioning a node
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Identity creation is the human's job; lifecycle is scriptable:
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1. Human: generate the node's WireGuard config once (wgcf register +
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wgcf generate, or warp-cli equivalent) and place it at
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/etc/netvm/<node>.conf (root-owned, 0600). This file is a credential —
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agents never create, read, or copy it.
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2. sudo bin/netvm-node-up.sh <node> — creates netns warp-<node>, raises
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the wg interface inside it, verifies egress, prints the result.
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3. chrome-box launches the client's Chromium inside that netns.
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Tear down: sudo bin/netvm-node-down.sh <node>.
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## Files
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- bin/netvm-verify.sh — prerequisite checks (ip, wg, netns, tailscale…).
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- bin/netvm-node-up.sh <node> — bring up a node's egress.
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- bin/netvm-node-down.sh <node> — tear a node's egress down.
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- bin/netvm-topology.sh — print the live topology table.
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- NODES.md — the registry: node -> netns -> Warp identity -> egress IP.
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## Verification checklist
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- [ ] netvm-verify.sh passes on the target host.
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- [ ] Per-node wg interface comes up inside its netns; egress IP differs
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per node (or matches the designed sharing in NODES.md).
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- [ ] Egress IP per node stable over 7 days (same colo pool).
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- [ ] Chromium launched in the netns reaches the internet via the node's
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egress (ip netns exec warp-<node> curl ifconfig.me).
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- [ ] Waypipe handoff to a node over the tailnet shows a live browser.
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- [ ] One node's egress killed -> other nodes unaffected (blast radius).
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