chore(fleet): sync operator memory, hatch menu dialogs, and watchdog alerts
This commit is contained in:
operator
+138
-24
@@ -1,33 +1,52 @@
|
||||
#!/usr/bin/env python3
|
||||
"""
|
||||
Side-chat to main-chat work siphon — detection rules.
|
||||
Side-chat to main-chat work siphon — detection rules (REPAIRED, agent 2 of 5).
|
||||
|
||||
Monitors side chat messages and identifies "siphon-worthy" content:
|
||||
work that should surface in main chat for visibility.
|
||||
Fixes the false-positive ✅ COMPLETED relay at the source:
|
||||
"Sending is disabled until this conversation can be verified." → COMPLETED
|
||||
was caused by a SINGLE keyword ("verified") matching one regex.
|
||||
|
||||
Categories:
|
||||
COMPLETED - work finished, results ready
|
||||
BLOCKER - something is stuck, needs intervention
|
||||
DECISION - a decision is needed from the user/operator
|
||||
ALERT - health/security/urgency signal
|
||||
MILESTONE - significant progress checkpoint
|
||||
Repairs (see OUTPUT.md for rationale):
|
||||
1. COMPLETED requires >= 2 DISTINCT pattern hits (weighted: the structured
|
||||
`[RESULT ...] OK` marker counts 2 — it is the fleet's own machine-emitted
|
||||
completion signal, far less ambiguous than a bare "done").
|
||||
2. Negation guards: negation/failure-state words veto COMPLETED outright
|
||||
(fail-closed: a negated completion claim is never relayed as complete).
|
||||
3. Honest labeling: the fake "confidence 60%" (which literally meant "one
|
||||
regex hit") is replaced by a keyword-hit count. SiphonHit.hits is the
|
||||
authoritative field; `confidence` is kept for backward compatibility
|
||||
but must NOT be rendered as a percentage anywhere user-facing.
|
||||
4. Stale suppression: a message older than 15 minutes never relays as
|
||||
COMPLETED. Pass message_ts (epoch seconds). monitor.py currently does
|
||||
NOT pass a timestamp — agent 3 / the integrator must thread
|
||||
message["ts"] through (see OUTPUT.md).
|
||||
|
||||
Detection is purely pattern-based (raw Python, no AI).
|
||||
Each rule returns (category, confidence, summary) or None.
|
||||
DO NOT overwrite the original detect.py with this file until the integrator
|
||||
reconciles all 5 agents' outputs.
|
||||
"""
|
||||
|
||||
import re
|
||||
from dataclasses import dataclass
|
||||
import time
|
||||
from dataclasses import dataclass, field
|
||||
from typing import Optional
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
@dataclass
|
||||
class SiphonHit:
|
||||
category: str # COMPLETED, BLOCKER, DECISION, ALERT, MILESTONE
|
||||
confidence: float # 0.0 - 1.0
|
||||
summary: str # one-line summary for main chat
|
||||
thread_id: str # source side chat
|
||||
message_id: str # source message
|
||||
confidence: float # LEGACY — kept for API compatibility only.
|
||||
# Do NOT render as "confidence NN%"; it is not a
|
||||
# reliability measure. See `hits`.
|
||||
hits: int = 0 # AUTHORITATIVE — distinct keyword-pattern hits
|
||||
# (weighted; see COMPLETED_PATTERN_WEIGHTS).
|
||||
summary: str = "" # one-line summary for main chat
|
||||
thread_id: str = "" # source side chat
|
||||
message_id: str = "" # source message
|
||||
author: str = "" # INTEGRATOR (agent 3 absent) — the message's real
|
||||
# author, plumbed from message["author"] by
|
||||
# monitor.py. Empty = unknown; NEVER substitute the
|
||||
# thread's registered agent silently (see
|
||||
# format_siphon).
|
||||
# Full message text is NOT stored here — main chat gets a summary
|
||||
# plus a link back, never the full content (safety: no sensitive
|
||||
# data siphoned verbatim).
|
||||
@@ -42,6 +61,11 @@ COMPLETED_PATTERNS = [
|
||||
re.compile(r'\b(merged|committed|pushed|published)\b', re.I),
|
||||
]
|
||||
|
||||
# Weighted hits: the structured [RESULT] OK marker is the fleet's own
|
||||
# machine-emitted completion signal — unambiguous enough to stand alone.
|
||||
COMPLETED_PATTERN_WEIGHTS = {0: 1, 1: 1, 2: 2, 3: 1}
|
||||
COMPLETED_MIN_WEIGHT = 2 # >= 2 distinct pattern hits (or one [RESULT] OK)
|
||||
|
||||
BLOCKER_PATTERNS = [
|
||||
re.compile(r'\b(blocked|stuck|failing|broken|down|error|failed)\b', re.I),
|
||||
re.compile(r'\b(need|needs|waiting)\s+(your|approval|input|decision)\b', re.I),
|
||||
@@ -75,9 +99,29 @@ SUPPRESS_PATTERNS = [
|
||||
re.compile(r'\[do not siphon\]', re.I), # explicit opt-out marker
|
||||
]
|
||||
|
||||
# --- Negation guards: any match vetoes COMPLETED (fail-closed) ---
|
||||
# A completion claim in the presence of negation / failure-state language
|
||||
# is never relayed as ✅ COMPLETED, no matter how many keywords hit.
|
||||
NEGATION_GUARDS = [
|
||||
# explicit negation
|
||||
re.compile(r'\b(not|never|no|nothing|none|neither|nor)\b', re.I),
|
||||
re.compile(r"\b(do not|don't|didn't|doesn't|won't|can't|cannot|isn't|aren't|"
|
||||
r"wasn't|weren't|haven't|hasn't|hadn't|couldn't|shouldn't)\b", re.I),
|
||||
# incompleteness hedges
|
||||
re.compile(r'\b(still|yet|pending|unfinished|incomplete)\b', re.I),
|
||||
# failure-state words (a "completed" message containing these is suspect)
|
||||
re.compile(r'\b(broken|failed|failing|failure|down|stuck|blocked|disabled|'
|
||||
r'error|errors|crash|crashed)\b', re.I),
|
||||
# hedging conjunctions ("deployed, but tests are red")
|
||||
re.compile(r'\b(but|however|although|though)\b', re.I),
|
||||
]
|
||||
|
||||
# Messages older than this never relay as COMPLETED (seconds).
|
||||
COMPLETED_MAX_AGE_S = 15 * 60
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def _match_score(text: str, patterns) -> float:
|
||||
"""Return confidence based on how many patterns match."""
|
||||
"""Legacy confidence for non-COMPLETED categories (unchanged)."""
|
||||
hits = sum(1 for p in patterns if p.search(text))
|
||||
if hits == 0:
|
||||
return 0.0
|
||||
@@ -85,6 +129,21 @@ def _match_score(text: str, patterns) -> float:
|
||||
return min(0.95, 0.6 + (hits - 1) * 0.2)
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def _completed_weight(text: str):
|
||||
"""
|
||||
Return (weighted_hits, distinct_hits, matched_pattern_indexes) for
|
||||
COMPLETED_PATTERNS. Weighted: [RESULT] OK counts 2.
|
||||
"""
|
||||
matched = [i for i, p in enumerate(COMPLETED_PATTERNS) if p.search(text)]
|
||||
weight = sum(COMPLETED_PATTERN_WEIGHTS.get(i, 1) for i in matched)
|
||||
return weight, len(matched), matched
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def _is_negated(text: str) -> bool:
|
||||
"""True if any negation guard fires anywhere in the text."""
|
||||
return any(p.search(text) for p in NEGATION_GUARDS)
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def _extract_summary(text: str, max_len: int = 120) -> str:
|
||||
"""Extract a safe one-line summary. Strips to first meaningful line."""
|
||||
# Take first non-empty line, truncate
|
||||
@@ -98,28 +157,58 @@ def _extract_summary(text: str, max_len: int = 120) -> str:
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def detect(text: str, thread_id: str, message_id: str,
|
||||
min_confidence: float = 0.6) -> Optional[SiphonHit]:
|
||||
min_confidence: float = 0.6,
|
||||
message_ts: Optional[float] = None) -> Optional[SiphonHit]:
|
||||
"""
|
||||
Check a side chat message for siphon-worthy content.
|
||||
Returns SiphonHit or None.
|
||||
|
||||
message_ts: epoch seconds of the original message (optional). Messages
|
||||
older than COMPLETED_MAX_AGE_S (15 min) never relay as COMPLETED.
|
||||
NOTE: monitor.py does not currently pass a timestamp — agent 3 / the
|
||||
integrator must thread message["ts"] through the detect() call.
|
||||
"""
|
||||
# Safety: suppress sensitive content
|
||||
for p in SUPPRESS_PATTERNS:
|
||||
if p.search(text):
|
||||
return None
|
||||
|
||||
# Stale suppression applies to COMPLETED only.
|
||||
completed_allowed = True
|
||||
if message_ts is not None:
|
||||
try:
|
||||
age = time.time() - float(message_ts)
|
||||
if age > COMPLETED_MAX_AGE_S:
|
||||
completed_allowed = False
|
||||
except (TypeError, ValueError):
|
||||
pass # unparseable ts: proceed, do not fail closed on metadata
|
||||
|
||||
# COMPLETED: >=2 distinct weighted pattern hits, no negation, not stale.
|
||||
completed_hits = 0
|
||||
completed_conf = 0.0
|
||||
if completed_allowed and not _is_negated(text):
|
||||
weight, distinct, _ = _completed_weight(text)
|
||||
if weight >= COMPLETED_MIN_WEIGHT:
|
||||
completed_hits = weight
|
||||
# legacy confidence kept for API compat; NOT a reliability measure
|
||||
completed_conf = min(0.95, 0.6 + (distinct - 1) * 0.2)
|
||||
|
||||
candidates = [
|
||||
("COMPLETED", _match_score(text, COMPLETED_PATTERNS)),
|
||||
("BLOCKER", _match_score(text, BLOCKER_PATTERNS)),
|
||||
("DECISION", _match_score(text, DECISION_PATTERNS)),
|
||||
("ALERT", _match_score(text, ALERT_PATTERNS)),
|
||||
("MILESTONE", _match_score(text, MILESTONE_PATTERNS)),
|
||||
("COMPLETED", completed_conf, completed_hits),
|
||||
("BLOCKER", _match_score(text, BLOCKER_PATTERNS),
|
||||
sum(1 for p in BLOCKER_PATTERNS if p.search(text))),
|
||||
("DECISION", _match_score(text, DECISION_PATTERNS),
|
||||
sum(1 for p in DECISION_PATTERNS if p.search(text))),
|
||||
("ALERT", _match_score(text, ALERT_PATTERNS),
|
||||
sum(1 for p in ALERT_PATTERNS if p.search(text))),
|
||||
("MILESTONE", _match_score(text, MILESTONE_PATTERNS),
|
||||
sum(1 for p in MILESTONE_PATTERNS if p.search(text))),
|
||||
]
|
||||
|
||||
# Sort by confidence descending; ALERT wins ties (safety: urgency first)
|
||||
# Use negative confidence for descending, and ALERT as tiebreaker
|
||||
candidates.sort(key=lambda x: (-x[1], 0 if x[0] == "ALERT" else 1))
|
||||
best_cat, best_conf = candidates[0]
|
||||
best_cat, best_conf, best_hits = candidates[0]
|
||||
|
||||
if best_conf < min_confidence:
|
||||
return None
|
||||
@@ -127,12 +216,37 @@ def detect(text: str, thread_id: str, message_id: str,
|
||||
return SiphonHit(
|
||||
category=best_cat,
|
||||
confidence=best_conf,
|
||||
hits=best_hits,
|
||||
summary=_extract_summary(text),
|
||||
thread_id=thread_id,
|
||||
message_id=message_id,
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def format_siphon(hit: SiphonHit, agent_name: str = "sidechat") -> str:
|
||||
"""
|
||||
Format a siphon message for main chat.
|
||||
HONEST LABELING: reports keyword hit count, never a fake "confidence %".
|
||||
HONEST AUTHORSHIP (integrator, agent 3 absent): attributes the message's
|
||||
real author when known. Falls back to the thread's registered agent only
|
||||
when the author is unknown — and says so explicitly, so a relay can
|
||||
never again launder thread ownership as authorship.
|
||||
"""
|
||||
emoji = {"COMPLETED": "✅", "BLOCKER": "🚧", "DECISION": "❓",
|
||||
"ALERT": "🚨", "MILESTONE": "🎯"}.get(hit.category, "📋")
|
||||
thread_url = f"https://muse.ai/thread/{hit.thread_id}"
|
||||
if hit.author:
|
||||
attribution = f"from {hit.author}"
|
||||
else:
|
||||
attribution = f"from {agent_name} side chat (author unverified)"
|
||||
return (
|
||||
f"{emoji} [{hit.category}] {attribution}\n"
|
||||
f"{hit.summary}\n"
|
||||
f"→ {thread_url}\n"
|
||||
f"(keyword hits: {hit.hits})"
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
# --- Opt-out registry ---
|
||||
|
||||
_opt_out_threads: set = set()
|
||||
|
||||
Reference in New Issue
Block a user