feat(supervision): add choice watcher daemon, HTTPS spec docs, and test suites

- bin/muse_choice_watcher.py + systemd/muse-choices-reconcile.*: automatic choice answering and timer reconciliation
- bin/digest.py: fleet log and health summarization
- docs/BOX-*-HTTPS.md: comprehensive HTTPS execution contracts and API documentation
- docs/MUSE-CHOICES-POLICY.md & docs/SUPERVISION-SPEC.md: autonomous execution specs
- tests/test_*.py: unit test suites for HTTPS API, choice watcher, fleet heal, and swarm pruning

docs/BOX-APPROVALS-HTTPS.md

@@ -0,0 +1,92 @@
+# Box Approvals over HTTPS (No SSH)
+
+> **Box is the main surface.** All operator work goes through Box (box.muse-dev.online). The web UI, `box` CLI, and agents share the same API endpoints. No UI-only powers.
+
+**Date:** 2026-10-06
+**Status:** implemented on bl (`exec-constrained.py` + `box-relay.sh`;
+`box-ctl.py` verbs pre-existed, plus fast node validation and
+`quality-validate` branches; `approvals.py` untouched)
+**Scope:** approval visibility (check) + governed decisions (deny, auto,
+one-shot allow). Persistent/forced allow (`--always`/`--force`) stays
+SSH-only.
+
+## 1. Why
+
+Agents blocked on browser approvals needed SSH to see fleet approval
+state, deny a bad prompt, auto-resolve trusted prompts, or allow a
+known-good one. All of this now rides the agent HTTPS path
+(`https://exec.muse-dev.online/exec`, signature or Bearer [REDACTED], named-op
+allowlist, audit log).
+
+## 2. New ops
+
+| Op | Args | Backend | Access |
+|---|---|---|---|
+| `approval.check` | `{node?}` (default fleet) | `box-ctl.py approval-check` | read-only, in `DEFAULT_PERMS` |
+| `approval.deny` | `{node!, message!, allow_main_chat?}` | `box-ctl.py approval-deny` | known-identities-only |
+| `approval.auto` | `{node?}` (default fleet) | `box-ctl.py approval-auto` | known-identities-only |
+| `approval.allow` | `{node!, message!, allow_main_chat?}` | `box-ctl.py approval-allow` (one-shot) | known-identities-only |
+
+New `box-relay.sh` client commands:
+
+```bash
+box approvals check [node]
+box approvals allow <node> --message <text> [--allow-main-chat]
+box approvals deny <node> --message <text> [--allow-main-chat]
+box approvals auto [node]
+```
+
+Raw op calls (signature auth, no token):
+
+```bash
+exec-sign.sh approval.check '{}'
+exec-sign.sh approval.check '{"node": "646"}'
+exec-sign.sh approval.allow '{"node": "646", "message": "trusted deploy script"}'
+exec-sign.sh approval.auto '{"node": "opm"}'
+```
+
+## 3. What the decisions do
+
+- `approval.allow` clicks Allow **once** on the node's active prompt.
+  There is deliberately no remote `--always` (persistent site allow)
+  or `--force`.
+- `approval.deny` clicks Deny on the node's active prompt.
+- `approval.auto` scans (fleet or one node) and allows only TRUSTED
+  non-key prompts. Key/passkey approvals are never auto-approved;
+  they need an explicit allow/deny, which notifies the waiting agent.
+- All three are audited with identity + op + node.
+
+## 4. Safety notes (same posture as existing ops)
+
+- **Attribution is mandatory.** The allow/deny flows DM the waiting
+  agent, historically with an `[operator]` prefix. A remote caller is
+  an agent, not the operator — so the exec layer **requires** a
+  non-empty `message` (≤2000 chars, no controls) on both allow and
+  deny. (`box-ctl.py` still permits omitting `--message` for SSH
+  callers; the HTTPS layer is the narrower gate.)
+- **One-shot only.** The allow argv never carries `--always` or
+  `--force`; the validators reject those keys. Persistence stays an
+  SSH-side decision.
+- **Sidechat-first.** `allow_main_chat` defaults to false; Main Chat
+  delivery needs the explicit flag, same as `notify`/`dm.ack`.
+- **Fixed argv, validated values.** Nodes must be fleet members (fast
+  `BAD_NODE` before any CDP probe — `approval-check`/`approval-auto`
+  gained the same node check allow/deny already had); unknown arg
+  keys rejected.
+- **Timeouts.** Check 180s (fleet CDP scan), auto 300s (scan plus one
+  click per trusted prompt), allow/deny 120s.
+- **Retry-safe reads.** `approval-check` / `approval-list` joined
+  `IDEMPOTENT_ACTIONS`; all six approval verbs have
+  `quality-validate` dry-run branches.
+
+## 5. Rollout notes
+
+- Restart `exec-constrained.py` after deploy for the 4 new ops to
+  appear in `GET /ops` (repo total becomes 83).
+- `box-relay.sh` is served from bl (`GET /box`); agents re-fetch to
+  get the `approvals` group.
+- While fleet browsers crash-loop, decision ops fail honestly
+  (`APPROVAL_FAILED` / CDP errors) instead of hanging; check still
+  reports per-node state including `UNREACHABLE`.
+- Non-goals: deletes, `main-loop` enable/disable, policy writes,
+  swarm kill/prune — future expansions, same pattern.